This (past) week on the SSRN Political Science Network

This past week saw a host of interesting papers posted on SSRN’s Political Science Network, including:

Separation of Powers and Turnout – by Rebecca Morton, Charles Shipan, and Melanie Springer

Abstract:
Do separation of powers systems produce lower levels of voter turnout? We analyze this question by taking advantage of institutional variation across U.S. states. In some states, governors and legislatures share power roughly evenly, which creates a sharing of powers that approximates a classic separation of powers system. In other states, power is unequally distributed, thereby approximating a system in which powers are not shared. We find that turnout is lower in systems in which power is shared equally, indicating that separation of powers does indeed decrease turnout.

The Behavioral Logic of Collection Action: Partisans Cooperate and Punish More than Non-Partisans - by Smirnov, Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, and McElreath

Abstract:
Why do individuals engage in personally costly, partisan activities that benefit others? If individuals act according to rational self-interest, then partisan activity occurs only when the benefits of that activity exceed its costs. However, laboratory experiments suggest that many people are willing to contribute to public goods and to punish those who do not contribute – even when these activities are personally costly and when members of the experimental group are completely anonymous. We hypothesize that these individuals, called strong reciprocators, underlie the capacity of political parties to organize competition for scarce resources and the production of public goods. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an experiment that includes a random income game with costly income alteration and a standard public goods game with costly punishment. These games allow us to gauge participants’ willingness to contribute to public goods and to engage in the costly punishment of free-riders. The results show that partisans are more likely than nonpartisans to contribute to public goods and to engage in costly punishment. Thus, inherent tastes for cooperation and sanctioning help resolve the paradox of party participation.

Gresham’s Law of Cue-Taking: How Bad Cues Drive Out Good Ones – by Cheryl Boudreau

Abstract:
Although many cues exist in the real world, few scholars study whether citizens can improve their decisions when they are exposed to multiple cues that send conflicting signals about which choice they should make. Thus, I conduct experiments in which I manipulate whether subjects are exposed to zero cues, one cue, or two conflicting cues before they make their decisions. My results suggest that a version of Gresham’s Law may operate in the context of cue-taking. That is, when subjects are exposed to one cue that suggests the correct choice, they are able to improve their decisions. However, when that same cue is presented together with a cue that suggests the incorrect choice, subjects make significantly worse decisions. This result occurs because subjects who are exposed to two conflicting cues are more likely to base their decisions upon the cue that suggests the incorrect choice or forego participation entirely.

And, finally, Is Dick Cheney Unconstitutional? – by Glenn (Instapundit) Reynolds

Abstract:
During a recent policy kerfuffle, Vice President Dick Cheney’s office briefly argued that the Vice President is really a legislative official, and hence not subject to some obligations of the Executive branch. Though Cheney’s office quickly shifted its argument to less controversial statutory grounds, it turns out that the Vice Presidency’s legislative character is, in fact, quite significant. To the extent that the Vice President is a legislative official, however, it is likely that extensive delegation of Presidential authority to the Vice President, of the sort that Vice President Cheney has enjoyed, is probably unconstitutional and certainly unwise.